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SUMMARY 
 
This paper compares two recent books addressing issues in human well-being, rights and development: A 
Theory of Human Need by Doyal and Gough and Women and Human Development: The Capabilities 
Approach by Martha Nussbaum. The first part identifies the common project which underlies both works: to 
clarify and defend those universal human interests which underpin an emancipatory and effective political 
programme for all women and men. The next two sections set out in some detail the different approaches 
in terms of needs and capabilities respectively, the taxonomies of each and the thinking behind them. In 
the fourth section, the two approaches are compared in terms of their components, derivation and 
thresholds, and some preliminary evaluations are offered. The paper concludes that the hierarchical 
approach of the Doyal-Gough theory can mediate between Nussbaum’s ‘thick’ and Amartya Sen’s ‘thin’ 
approach to capabilities and well-being.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Martha Nussbaum’s Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (2000 – hereafter 
WHD) provides an eloquent, rigorous and passionate statement of her latest views on human capabilities. 
It goes further than her previous work in relating these to the ethics and politics of development. It applies 
the approach directly and with insight to the predicament faced by women across the developing world, 
notably in two chapters on religion and care.  
 
This paper critically discusses Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and compares it with the needs 
perspective developed in the earlier book by Len Doyal and myself, A Theory of Human Need (1991 – 
hereafter THN).  Though there are remarkable similarities between the two, both were written 
independently. When completing our book, published in 1991, we were unaware of Nussbaum’s earliest 
article on this theme ‘Nature, function and capability: Aristotle on political distribution’, published in 1988, 
whereas her subsequent work was written in ignorance of our own contribution.  
 
The publication of WHD provides an opportunity to compare and evaluate our theory of human need with 
her latest and most developed perspective on human capabilities. However, this paper limits itself to the 
very specific issue of ‘lists’ and ‘thresholds’. Unlike Sen, Nussbaum explicitly provides a comprehensive list 
of ‘central human functional capabilities’ which we can compare with our hierarchical model of human 
needs. Many other important issues related to her self-proclaimed neo-Aristotelian approach are ignored, 
and even within this remit much must be omitted within a short paper.  
 
Throughout we use Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach as the core text to 
illustrate Nussbaum’s latest and most developed thinking on this topic. This work developed out of the 
1998 Seeley lectures at the University of Cambridge and marks a clear advance on her earlier work on 
capabilities (Nussbaum 1992, 1993, 1995a, 1995b). According to Gasper (2001) it reflects among other 
things her move to the Chair of Law and Ethics at Chicago and two research visits to India in 1997 and 
1998.  
 
In the first part of this paper I identify the common project which underlies both Nussbaum’s and our own 
work: to clarify and defend those universal human interests which alone can underpin an emancipatory and 
effective political programme for all women and men. The next two sections then set out in some detail our 
different taxonomies of capabilities and needs, and the thinking behind them. In the fourth section, the two 
approaches are compared in terms of their components, derivation and thresholds, and some preliminary 
evaluations are offered.  
  
But first a note on terminology.  
 
ARGUMENTS FOR UNIVERSALS 
 
Though Nussbaum uses different terms from us - 'capabilities' versus ‘needs’ – we have much in common, 
notably the goal of developing a genuinely universal argument for human emancipation. Though her book 
explicitly focuses on women’s capabilities and options, and engages with the specific obstacles faced by 
most women and girls on the planet, this is at all times embedded in a theory which applies equally to men 
and boys. In particular, the two books argue the following three positions.  
 
1. A 'fully universal' conception of capabilities/ needs 
 
Taking for granted a world where many women lack support for fundamental functions of a human life, and 
where most women have fewer capabilities than men, her goal is to develop a ‘universalist feminism’ 
(WHD 7). The philosophical underpinning for this universalism is the idea of human functionings, one 
respect among several where her work inter-relates with that of Amartya Sen. Sen defines a functioning as 
‘an achievement of a person: what she or he manages to do or to be’ (Sen 1985: 12). Elsewhere he writes 
that functionings ‘constitute a person’s being’ and, since functionings are ‘intrinsically valuable’ they 
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amount to states of well-being (Sen 1992: 4-7). Capabilities then refer to the set of functionings that is 
feasible to that person - that she could choose.  
 
However, Nussbaum, whose work in this area began independently of Sen, is more direct in addressing 
the issues of cross-cultural comparison and evaluation which this entails: ‘An international feminism that is 
going to have any bite quickly gets involved in making normative recommendations that cross boundaries 
of culture, nation, religion, race and class. It will therefore need to find descriptive and normative concept 
adequate to that task. I shall argue that certain universal norms of human capability should be central for 
political purposes in thinking about basic political principles that can provide the underpinning for a set of 
constitutional guarantees in all nations. I shall also argue that these norms are legitimately used in making 
comparisons across nations, asking how well they are doing relative to one another in promoting human 
quality of life’ (WHD 34-35). ‘The account we search for should preserve liberties and opportunities for 
each and every person, taken one by one, respecting each of them as an end, rather than simply as the 
agent or supporter of the ends of others’ (WHD 55). This ‘focus on the individual person as such requires 
no particular metaphysical tradition … It arises naturally from the recognition that each person has just one 
life to live’ (WHD 56).1 
 
This compares with our own argument: ‘Health and autonomy are basic needs which [all] humans must 
satisfy in order to avoid the serious harm of fundamentally impaired participation in their form of life… It is 
possible in principle to compare levels of basic need-satisfaction in these terms not only within but also 
between cultures’ (THN 73-74). To quote Soper (1993b 74): ‘What [Doyal and Gough’s] work shows, they 
would argue, is that you can chart basic need satisfaction for “objective” welfare without either embracing 
relativism or operating at such a level of generality that the pertinence of the theory for specific problems 
concerning social policy is sacrificed’. 
 
2. A critique of cultural relativism  
 
Nussbaum develops an explicit critique of relativism2 by addressing three ‘apparently respectable’ 
arguments against universalism: the argument from culture, the argument from the good of diversity, and 
the argument from paternalism (WHD 41-50).  We can drastically summarise her three counter-arguments 
as follows. First, real cultures are always dynamic and evolving: ‘People are resourceful borrowers of 
ideas’ (WHD 48). Second, the ‘argument for the good of diversity’ is fine so long as cultural practices do 
not harm people. But since some practices clearly do, this ‘objection does not undermine the search for 
universal values, it requires it’ (WHD 50). Third, relativist critiques of the ‘paternalism’ endorsed at some 
level by universal approaches is a double-edged sword. Many traditional value systems are paternalist in 
the strict sense of the word. More fundamentally, a commitment to respecting people’s choices endorses at 
least one universal value, that of having the opportunity to think and choose for oneself (WHD 51).  
 
We develop an explicit but different critique of cultural relativism. First, we argue that all contemporary 
forms of relativism are internally inconsistent. Variants of relativism can be found in exponents of orthodox 
economics, liberalism, Marxism, critics of cultural imperialism, theories of radical democracy and 
phenomenological sociology; but ‘all have attempted to denounce universal standards of evaluation with 
one hand only to employ them to endorse some favoured view of the world with the other (THN 33). 
Second, we address and rebut specific claims that conceptions of health (one of our basic needs) are 
internal to cultural systems of thought, thus denying any rational choice between them. We tackle this by 
considering persons from different cultures suffering from (what the biomedical model terms) TB, and then 
go on to the more difficult case of severe depression (THN 57-59, 63-64, 180-81). Even in the case of 
depression, sufferers exhibit common symptoms across widely different cultures, such as hopelessness, 
breathlessness, lack of energy, and feelings of inadequacy. These common symptoms lead to the same 
kinds of disability across cultures, notwithstanding divergent and indeed incompatible ways of interpreting 
them. 
                                                 
1  She notes that of the major world religions only Buddhism seriously challenges this sort of emphasis on 
the individual. 
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2  This is one of the contrasts she draws between her work and that of Amartya Sen. 
 
3. An argument that the existence of needs/ capabilities entails strong moral claims to meet 
needs / develop capabilities. 
 
Nussbaum’s aim is ‘to provide the philosophical underpinning for an account of basic constitutional 
principles that should be respected and implemented by the governments of all nations, as a bare 
minimum of what respect for human dignity requires’ (WHD 5). ‘In certain core areas of human functioning 
a necessary condition of justice for a public political arrangement is that it delivers to citizens a certain 
basic level of capability. If people are systematically falling below the threshold in any of these core areas, 
this should be seen as a situation both unjust and tragic’ (WHD 71). The language of rights permits us to 
draw strong normative conclusions from the fact of basic capabilities (WHD 100). In so doing, Nussbaum 
differs from Sen in regarding all capabilities as equally fundamental and rejecting Rawls’ argument for the 
priority of liberty (WHD 12).  
 
This is similar to our statement at the start of THN (2): ‘It is difficult to see how political movements which 
espouse the improvement of human welfare can fail to endorse the following related beliefs: 
1. Humans can be seriously harmed by alterable social circumstances, which can give rise to 
profound suffering. 
2. Social justice exists in inverse proportion to serious harm and suffering…’  
 
However, we go further than Nussbaum in relating such rights to corresponding duties. Our argument in 
brief is as follows (see THN chapter 6 for the full argument): 
1. The membership of any social group implies obligations or duties. 
2. To ascribe duties to someone presupposes that they are in fact able to perform these duties. 
3. The ascription of a duty thus logically entails that the bearer of the duty is entitled to the need 
satisfaction necessary to enable her or him to undertake that duty. It is inconsistent for a social 
group to lay responsibilities on some person without ensuring she has the wherewithal to discharge 
those responsibilities. 
4. Where the social group is large, this entails similar obligations to strangers, whose needs we do not 
directly witness and can do nothing individually to satisfy. This will require support for agencies that 
guarantee to meet the needs of strangers. This is a plausible definition of a ‘welfare state’: public 
rights or entitlements to the means to human welfare in general and to minimum standards of well-
being in particular, independent of rights based on property or income. Only the state can 
guarantee strong entitlements to people of this sort, though this does not require that it directly 
provides the satisfiers. It is at this stage, that we also argue for the equal prioritisation of rights to 
basic need satisfaction and reject Rawls’ lexical ordering (THN 132-4).3 
 
 
It is clear that the philosophical and political agenda underlying our two approaches is a search for a 
universal conception of the needs and capacities of men and women everywhere. The differences that we 
now go on to outline should be seen as contrasting approaches to pursue a broadly common agenda. 
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3 However, we go one step beyond the traditional confines of social policy. This commitment to meet the 
needs of strangers and to support the necessary welfare structures cannot stop at the borders of any 
particular state. The idea of universal human needs leads remorselessly to the global guarantee of their 
satisfaction. It lends powerful support to contemporary ideas of cosmopolitanism, which sees the entire 
world as a potential political community - however difficult are the obstacles and however utopian this 
sounds to our ears today. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NUSSBAUM ON CENTRAL HUMAN FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITIES 
 
Her most important difference with Sen, claims Nussbaum, is that he has ‘never made a list of the central 
capabilities’ (WHD 13).4 Nussbaum tackles this head-on and presents her own ‘current list’ of ten ‘central 
human functional capabilities’ (CHFCs). These are (WHD 78-80): 
 
1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length: not dying prematurely, or before 
one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living.  
 
2. Bodily health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be adequately 
nourished; to have adequate shelter. 
 
3. Bodily integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; having one’s bodily boundaries 
treated as sovereign, i.e. being able to be secure against assault, including sexual assault, child 
sexual abuse, and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in 
matters of reproduction. 
 
4. Senses, imagination and thought. Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think and reason – and 
to do these things in a ‘truly human’ way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education, 
including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being 
able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing self-expressive 
works and events of one’s own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to use 
one’s mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political 
and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to search for the ultimate 
meaning of life in one’s own way. Being able to have pleasurable experiences, and to avoid non-
necessary pain. 
 
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to love those 
who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience 
longing, gratitude and justified anger. Not having one’s emotional development blighted by 
overwhelming fear and anxiety, or by traumatic events of abuse or neglect. (Supporting this 
capability means supporting forms of human association that can be shown to be crucial in their 
development.) 
 
6. Practical reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection 
about the planning of one’s life. (This entails protection for the liberty of conscience.) 
 
7. Affiliation. A. Being able to live with and towards others, to recognize and show concern for other 
human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of 
another and to have compassion for that situation; to have the capability for both justice and 
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4  This criticism of Sen echoes our own (THN 156). Of course, Sen does provide examples of functionings 
but in an unsystematic way. Elsewhere I argue: ‘Sen’s examples [of functionings] include being happy, 
being able to choose, having good health, being adequately fed and sheltered, having self-respect, being 
able to appear in public without shame, and taking part in the life of the community. Though we may well 
value all these things, it is a rather strange list. It embraces subjective states (being happy) and objective 
states (being adequately fed), and culturally generalisable conditions (having good health) alongside 
specifically liberal values (being able to choose). It is not self-evident that all these are ‘intrinsically’ 
significant in defining the social good’ (Gough 2000: 6-7). 
friendship. (Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such 
forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech.)   B. Having 
the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being 
whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails, at a minimum, protections against discrimination 
on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, caste, ethnicity, or national origin. In work, 
being able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful 
relationships of mutual recognition with other workers. 
 
8. Other species. Being able to live with concern for, and in relation to, animals, plants and the world 
of nature. 
 
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities. 
 
10. Control over one’s environment. A. Political. Being able to participate effectively in political choices 
that govern one’s life; having the right of political participation, protections of free speech and 
association.  B. Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), not just 
formally but in terms of real opportunity; and having property rights on an equal basis with others; 
having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom from 
unwarranted search and seizure. 
 
Of these, Nussbaum identifies two, practical reason and affiliation, as of special significance because ‘they 
both organize and suffuse all the others, making their pursuit truly human’ (WHD 82). Later on she appears 
to add a third, bodily integrity, as of overriding importance (WHD 95). While some of the items on the list 
are timeless, the list is intended for the modern world: ‘literacy is a concrete specification for the modern 
world of a more general capability’. Nussbaum also stresses that ‘part of the idea of the list is its multiple 
realisability: its members can be more concretely specified in accordance with local beliefs and 
circumstances' (WHD 77). Furthermore, it ‘is, emphatically, a list of separate components. We cannot 
satisfy the need for one of them by giving a larger amount of another one. All are of central importance and 
all are distinct in quality’ (WHD 81). 
 
Nussbaum’s approach in WHD is a self-proclaimed ‘neo-Aristotelian’ one. Following his method in the 
Nicomachean Ethics she identifies ‘spheres of human experience that figure in more or less any human 
life, and in which more or less any human being will have to make some choices rather than others’ and to 
each of which there is a corresponding virtue (Nussbaum 1993: 245). This generates a slightly varying list 
of 10-11 spheres of experience. The approach identifies ‘a core idea [our italics] of the human being as a 
dignified free being who shapes his or her own life in cooperation and reciprocity with others… A life that is 
really human is one that is shaped throughout by these human powers of practical reason and sociability’ 
(WHD 72). This distinctive perspective generates a ‘thick’, richer conception of well-being compared with 
Sen’s more neo-Kantian approach.  
 
However, in her new work this philosophical approach is complemented, she claims, by a second, ongoing 
process of cross-cultural dialogue. ‘The methodology that has been used to modify the list .. [draws] both 
on the results of cross-cultural academic discussion and on discussions in women’s groups themselves’ 
(WHD 151). ‘Thus it already represents what it proposes: a type of overlapping consensus’ (WHD 76).5 The 
above list is notably the result of discussions in India and elsewhere. ‘In this sense the list remains open-
ended and humble’ (WHD 77). Her updated method appears to be one where the argument from principle 
at stage one is ‘envisaged as a first step in the process of reaching toward such a reflective equilibrium’ 
(WHD 151, our italics). This is then reiterated to approach an overlapping consensus. Her neo-Aristotelian 
proposal ‘is intended … (clearly unlike Aristotle’s) as a partial, not a comprehensive, conception of the 
good life, a moral conception selected for political purposes only’ (WHD 77). 
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5 She continues: ‘By “overlapping consensus” I mean what John Rawls means: that people may sign on to 
this conception as the freestanding moral core of a political conception, without accepting any particular 
metaphysical view of the world, any particular comprehensive ethical or religious view, or even any 
particular view of the person or of human nature’. 
 
 
DOYAL AND GOUGH: A THEORY OF HUMAN NEED 
 
We develop a listing of needs with many points of convergence with the above. However it is constructed 
in a very different way. Our approach is hierarchical moving from universal goals, through basic needs to 
intermediate needs, as summarised in Figure 1. The following summarises our argument in THN, 
predominantly chapters 4 and 8. 
 
Step 1. Normative/ ethical reasoning: identifying universal goals 
  
‘Need’ refers to a particular category of goals which are believed to be universalisable. The contrast with 
wants, goals which derive from an individual’s particular preferences and cultural environment, is central to 
our argument. The universality of need rests upon the belief that if needs are not satisfied then serious 
harm of some objective kind will result. We define serious harm as fundamental disablement in the pursuit 
of one’s vision of the good. It is not the same as subjective feelings like anxiety or unhappiness. Another 
way of describing such harm is as an impediment to successful social participation. Whatever the time, 
place and cultural group we grow up and live in, we act in it to some extent. We argue that we build a self-
conception of our own capabilities through interacting with and learning from others. This is an essential 
feature of our human nature. It follows that participation in some form of life without serious arbitrary 
limitations is ‘our most basic human interest’ (THN 55). 
 
 
Step 2. Basic needs: health and autonomy 
 
THN (52-54) develops a neo-Kantian argument in determining universal goals and basic needs: 
 
‘Although he was not directly concerned with the character of human need, [Kant] did articulate many 
concepts and arguments relevant to its theorisation. Kant showed that for individuals to act and to be 
responsible they must have both the physical and mental capacity to do so: at the very least a body which 
is alive and which is governed by all of the relevant causal processes and the mental competence to 
deliberate and to choose. Let us identify this latter capacity for choice with the existence of the most basic 
level of personal 'autonomy' … To be autonomous in this minimal sense is to have the ability to make 
informed choices about what should be done and how to go about doing it. This entails being able to 
formulate aims, and beliefs about how to achieve them, along with the ability to evaluate the success of 
beliefs in the light of empirical evidence… It makes sense, therefore, to claim that since physical survival 
and personal autonomy are the conditions for any individual action in any culture, they constitute the most 
basic human needs - those which must be satisfied to some degree before actors can participate in their 
form of life to achieve any other valued goals’.6 
 
Three key variables, we argue, affect levels of individual autonomy of agency (THN 59-59). First, cognitive 
and emotional capacity is a necessary pre-requisite for a person to initiate an action. Since all actions have 
to embody a modicum of reason to be classed as actions at all, it is difficult to give a precise definition of 
the minimum levels of rationality and responsibility present in the autonomous individual. Generally 
speaking, the existence of even minimal levels of autonomy will entail the following: 
 
a) that actors have the intellectual capacity for the formulation of aims and beliefs common to their form of 
life;  
b) that actors have enough confidence to want to act and thus to participate in some form of social life; 
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6 The term need has been used by some to denote the commodity pre-requisites for a full life (see Sen 
1985: 513), but that is not the way we use it. It pertains to a space independent of commodities and 
utilities, and is thus comparable to Sen and Nussbaum’s couplet of functionings and capabilities. That is 
why I sometimes refer in what follows to ‘needs/ capabilities’. 
Figure 1: The theory in outline 
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c) that actors sometimes actually do so through consistently formulating aims and beliefs and 
communicating with others about them; 
d) that actors perceive  their actions as having been done by them and not by someone else; 
e) that actors are able to understand the empirical constraints on the success of their actions; 
f) that actors are capable of taking responsibility for what they do. 
 
We go on to argue that this aspect of autonomy should at its most basic level be understood negatively – 
with reference to the serious objective disablement which results when one or more of these characteristics 
is absent. Mental health is then the obverse of this – ‘practical rationality and responsibility’ (THN 62). We 
address, though by no means systematically, some of the difficult issues of measurement this poses, citing 
evidence on the experiences and symptoms of mental illness across cultures. We conclude that, despite 
cultural variations in some features of, say, depression, these is a common core of disabling symptoms 
found in all cultures, including hopelessness, indecisiveness, a sense of futility and lack of energy (THN 
180). 
 
The second determinant of individual levels of autonomy is the level of cultural understanding a person has 
about herself, her culture and what is expected of her as an individual within it. This requires teachers and 
a form of teaching that is conducive to enquiry and further learning. Third and last, autonomy of agency 
requires a range of opportunities to undertake socially significant activities. Again, there is a problem in 
determining minimum opportunity sets, given that even the most oppressed of people can and will exercise 
choices. Nevertheless, some minimum freedom of agency is an essential component of autonomy of 
agency in all cultures. 
 
Lastly, we go on to recognise a higher-order level of autonomy, which we label critical autonomy. ‘Critical 
autonomy entails the capacity to compare cultural rules, to reflect upon the rules of one’s own culture, to 
work with others to change them and, in extremis, to move to another culture’ (THN 187). This requires, 
beyond freedom of agency, some measure of political freedom. This is not to deny that oppressed people 
exercise extremely high levels of creative and critical deliberation throughout their lives. It is for this reason 
that we favour defining critical autonomy as the possession of freedom of agency and political freedom 
(THN 68).7 
 
Step 3. Satisfiers and 'Intermediate Needs': the role of codified knowledge 
      
While the basic individual needs for physical health and autonomy are universal, most goods and services 
required to satisfy these needs are culturally variable. For example, the needs for food and shelter apply to 
all peoples, but there is a large variety of cuisines and forms of dwelling which can meet any given 
specification of nutrition and protection from the elements. Following Kamenetzky, we call all objects, 
activities and relationships which satisfy our basic needs 'satisfiers'. Basic needs then are always universal 
but their satisfiers are often relative.8 However, if this were all we could say, it would have little purchase on 
the issues of rights, morality and development that Nussbaum and we wish to address. Can a conceptual 
bridge be built to link basic needs and specific satisfiers? We contend that the notion of ‘universal satisfier 
characteristics’ can fulfill that role. 
 
                                                 
7  Contra Dworkin (1988:20) who distinguishes (second-order) autonomy as the capacity of persons to 
reflect on their first-order preferences, desires and wishes. For us this is a component of autonomy of 
agency everywhere, not just in political democracies. 
8 Following Sen’s similar point in his analysis of poverty: 'Poverty is an absolute notion in the space of 
capabilities but very often it will take a relative form in the space of commodities or characteristics' 
[1983,p.161]. Like Nussbaum, we stress that needs are plural and non-additive. ‘One domain of 
intermediate need-satisfaction cannot be traded off against another’ (THN 166). However we do recognize 
some limited areas where universal satisfiers are substitutes for one another. For example, a colder 
environment or heavy labour will increase the food requirements of humans. 
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This draws on Sen’s (1984) analysis, following Lancaster, between commodities, characteristics and 
functionings. We define 'satisfier characteristics' as that set of all characteristics that have the property of 
contributing to the satisfaction of our basic needs in one or any cultural setting. We then distinguish within 
this set a subset of universal satisfier characteristics: those characteristics of satisfiers which apply to all 
cultures. Universal satisfier characteristics are thus those properties of goods, services, activities and 
relationships which enhance physical health and human autonomy in all cultures.  For example, calories a 
day for a specified group of people constitutes a characteristic of (most) foodstuffs which has transcultural 
relevance. Similarly 'shelter from the elements' and 'protection from disease-carrying vectors' are two of the 
characteristics which all dwellings have in common (though to greatly varying degrees). The category of 
universal satisfier characteristics thus provides the crucial bridge between universal basic needs and 
socially relative satisfiers. They provide a foundation on which to erect a list of derived or second-order 
goals which must be achieved if the first-order goals of health and autonomy are to be attained (THN 155-
59).   
 
We group these intermediate needs in the following eleven categories:  
 
Nutritional food and clean water 
Protective housing 
A non-hazardous work environment 
A non-hazardous physical environment 
Safe birth control and child-bearing    
Appropriate health care 
A secure childhood 
Significant primary relationships 
Physical security 
Economic security 
Appropriate education 
 
Roughly speaking, the first six contribute to physical health and the last five to autonomy. The only criterion 
for inclusion in this list is whether or not any set of satisfier characteristics universally and positively 
contributes to physical health and autonomy.  If it does then it is classified as an intermediate need. If 
something is not universally necessary for enhanced basic need satisfaction, then it is not so classified, 
however widespread the commodity/ activity/ relationship may be. For example, 'sexual relationships' is not 
included in our list, because some people manage to live healthy and autonomous lives without inter-
personal sex. 
 
This list of universal satisfier characteristic is derived from two principle scientific sources. First, there is the 
best available scientific/ technical knowledge articulating causal relationships between physical health or 
autonomy and other factors. Second, there is comparative anthropological knowledge about practices in 
the numerous cultures and sub-cultures, states and political systems in the contemporary world. Thus to 
begin with it is the codified knowledge of the natural and social sciences that enable to determine the 
composition of intermediate needs. This knowledge changes and typically expands – today often at 
dizzying speeds – through time. We are comfortable to acknowledge that humans as a species have made 
and continue to make progress in their capacity to understand and satisfy their needs (THN 111). The 
concept of human need we develop is historically open to such continual improvements in understanding. 
 
This approach must however be complemented by the appeal to the experientially grounded knowledge of 
people. If need satisfaction is to be optimised all groups must have the ability to participate in research into 
need satisfiers and to contribute to policy-making. Utilising Habermas, we argue that any rational and 
effective attempt to resolve disputes over needs ‘must bring to bear both the codified knowledge of experts 
and the experiential knowledge of those whose basic needs and daily life world are under consideration .. It 
requires a dual strategy of social policy formation which values compromise, provided that it does not 
extend to the general character of basic human needs and rights’ (THN 141).  
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Thus, ‘our theory is essentially ‘iterative’: universal and objective needs can be shown to exist but the 
ongoing growth of knowledge continually modifies and improves our understanding of intermediate needs 
and how they can best be satisfied… The appropriate indicators of intermediate needs are continually open 
to question and improvement as a result of the growth of codified and experientially-grounded knowledge’ 
(THN 168). The practical solution to the problem of relating these two types of knowledge may be achieved 
through various forms of focus groups, as we recognised when discussing the assessment of disability 
(THN 174-76) and poverty (THN 323, fn.5). 
 
Step 4. Societal preconditions 
 
Concerned lest our emphasis on autonomy suggests an individualised conception of human agency, we 
spend chapter 5 of our book expounding the social dimension of autonomy. Following Braybrooke (1987: 
48-50), we identify four societal preconditions - production, reproduction, cultural transmission and political 
authority – which have to be satisfied by all  collectives if they are to survive and flourish over long periods 
of time (THN 80-90). Yet, though individual needs can never be satisfied independently of the social 
environment, we continue to insist that they must be conceptualised independently of any social 
environment. It is on this basis that we go to identify positive and negative freedoms as essential pre-
requisites for the exercise of critical autonomy.9 
 
Aside from these societal preconditions, we may summarise our approach in two steps (cf Gasper 1996):  
(a) First, neo-Kantian reasoning is deployed to derive two universal basic needs: health and autonomy. 
At this stage, normative/ethical theories are deployed to determine which prerequisites carry a 
priority status.  
(b) Codified and experiential knowledge is then drawn on to provide, at any point in time, the best 
available evidence on universal satisfier characteristics. This stage uses instrumental, positive 
analysis of the prerequisites for various types and levels of capacity or functioning (Gasper 1996: 
12).  
 
 
COMPARING AND EVALUATING THE TWO APPROACHES 
 
I will compare our two approaches under the following headings: components, derivation, and 
levels/thresholds. In the process I begin to evaluate the two and offer some defence of our own approach. 
 
Components 
 
Figure 2 brings these two lists together within the framework of our hierarchical model.  
 
                                                 
 12
9 The procedural and material preconditions for individual need satisfaction are discussed at length in 
Gough 2000, chapter 2. They are not pursued here. 
Figure 2: Comparing the lists 
 
NEEDS: Doyal and Gough CENTRAL HUMAN FUNCTIONAL 
CAPABILITIES : Nussbaum 
   
Universal goals Avoidance of serious harm Bodily integrity 
 Social participation Affiliation A: social interaction, 
compassion and justice 
 Critical participation Control over environment A: Political 
   
Basic needs Survival Life 
 Physical health Bodily health 
 Cognitive and emotional 
capacity 
Senses, imagination, thought 
Emotions 
Affiliation B: the social bases of self-
respect and freedom from 
discrimination 
 Cultural understanding: 
teachers 
Senses, imagination, thought 
 Opportunities to participate Affiliation A and B 
 Critical autonomy Practical reason 
Senses, imagination, thought 
   
Universal 
satisfier 
characteristics 
Nutrition and water Bodily health 
 Protective shelter Bodily health 
 Non-hazardous environment ? 
 Safe birth control and child-
bearing 
Bodily health and Bodily integrity 
 Appropriate health care ? 
 Security in childhood Bodily integrity 
Emotions 
 Significant primary 
relationships 
Emotions 
 Physical security Bodily integrity 
 Economic security Control over environment B: Material 
 Basic education Senses, imagination, thought 
   
Societal 
preconditions 
Civil/political rights and 
political participation 
Affiliation B: protection against 
discrimination 
Control over environment A: Political 
Also features in: 
Senses, imagination, thought 
Practical reason 
 Social/economic rights Control over environment B: Material 
Also features in: 
Affiliation A: institutions that nourish 
affiliation 
   
(Other) ? Affiliation A: Others 
 ? Other species 
 ? Play 
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In THN we caution that our list, like all taxonomies, is in one sense arbitrary (THN 159). The groups are 
'verbal wrappings' or 'labels' designed to demarcate one collection of characteristics from another. 
Moreover, the word-labels used will be ambiguous - they will 'not contain or exhaust the meaning of the 
need identified'. Ambiguity can be reduced by increasing the numbers of characteristics or 'need 
categories'. Yet the larger the set, the greater the problems in comprehending the totality of human needs. 
We believe that this dilemma is encountered by Nussbaum too, and indeed by anyone engaged in 
identifying components of well-being. The two lists must be compared bearing this in mind.  
 
The table shows that there is considerable overlap between the two lists, notwithstanding differences in 
‘labels’. This overlap is to be expected and is a notable finding of other comparisons of components of well-
being using a wider range of lists.10 Moreover, it is interesting that of the three CHFCs that Nussbaum 
identifies as central, affiliation is similar to our central goal of participation, whereas bodily integrity  and 
practical reason are closely related to our two basic needs of health and autonomy. This is an encouraging 
indication of the close parallels between our two projects. Yet, Nussbaum does not theoretically privilege 
these three components, as we do. 
 
Another difference is that Nussbaum’s CHFCs often include within them their societal preconditions. For 
example, after the component Affiliation A is introduced, there follows in parentheses: ‘Protecting this 
capability means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also 
protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech’ (WHD 79). Is it appropriate to include welfare and 
political rights of this sort within a list of human capabilities? Nussbaum addresses this by distinguishing 
between basic, internal and combined capabilities (WHD 84-85). Internal capabilities are those personal 
states that are ‘sufficient for the exercise of the requisite functions’. Combined capabilities are internal 
capabilities combined with suitable external conditions for the exercise of the function. Yet, little is made of 
this important distinction in what follows. We believe our strict distinction between, in a different language, 
human needs and the societal preconditions for their realization is more helpful. The former are attributes 
of individuals, the latter of collectivities.    
 
Despite the overlap between the lists, there are differences. On the one hand, there are CHFCs which do 
not appear in our matrix of needs: certain aspects of Nussbaum’s ‘affiliation’ do not appear to be covered 
by our universal goal of minimally disabled participation in one’s social form of life. Similarly, ‘play’ and ‘the 
ability to live in a fruitful relationship with animals and the world of nature’ are absent. Nussbaum 
comments frankly on the present lack of consensus the last achieved in her project (WHD 157). In which 
case, why include it? It is incredible to consider that this component ranks on a par with bodily integrity or 
practical reason. 
 
On the other hand we identify needs components which do not figure anywhere in Nussbaum’s list: the 
intermediate needs for a non-hazardous work and living environment and for appropriate health care. Ours 
is perhaps a more prosaic list. Some support for our approach is provided by a recent survey of a township 
and a village in South Africa, which enquired of poor people’s own conceptions of their well being and 
capabilities (Clark 2003). Clark concludes that Nussbaum’s ‘thick vague theory of the good’ ‘overlooks 
many of the harsh realities facing ordinary poor people … no special provisions are made to improve 
working conditions or guarantee access to certain basic needs’ (pp.15-16). It pays little or no attention to 
access to income, income security, education, training and skills, reasonable job opportunities, free time, 
sleep and rest, and personal safety. All these figure in our list of intermediate needs. Indeed, Clark claims 
that Nussbaum’s neglect follows from Aristotle’s central concern with Greek (male) citizens, rather than 
manual labourers, poor people, women and slaves, notwithstanding Nussbaum’s explicit rejection of this 
part of the Aristotelian argument (Nussbaum 1988: 156-7). 
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10 For comparisons of these and other lists see Saith (2001), Clark 2002 and Alkire (2002).  However Alkire 
inexplicably includes only our intermediate needs, and omits our basic needs, from her summary table. 
Derivation 
 
We clearly adopt very different approaches in constructing and deriving the two lists. Nussbaum claims that 
hers is two-stage and iterative: a core philosophical idea derived from Aristotle is examined in cross-
cultural dialogues, revised and resubmitted in an iterative fashion. Putting aside for the moment the 
question whether this accurately describes the derivation of her list, let me examine some of the 
implications.  
 
First, does not the Aristotelian stance (‘the noble shines through’) conflict with the plurality and humility of 
the consensual method? In particular, how can a reliance on the preferences of actors at the second stage 
be squared with the ‘independently justified list of substantive goods’ at the first stage? Does not the way 
that social contexts shape preferences and the way that individuals adapt their preferences to social 
imperatives militate against the likelihood of convergence between the two stages?11  
 
Second, and following on from this, if the method is genuinely open-ended, what are the limits to the list? 
Nussbaum claims at the end of her book that her approach is intended as ‘the systematization and 
theorization of thoughts that women are pursuing all over the world, when they ask how their lives might be 
improved’ (WHD 301). For Garagarella (2001) this is too sweeping a conclusion, given that her country, the 
U.S., does not represent the whole of the Western world, and India, her case study, does not represent the 
rest of the world. When 200-odd other countries are included in the process, not to speak of countless 
other sub-cultures and language groups, what is to stop the list of CHFCs expanding and dissipating?  
 
Nussbaum is aware of these concerns, and in Chapter 2 of WHD (titled Adaptive preferences and women’s 
options) she presents an insightful analysis of adaptive preferences and the obstacles these pose to 
securing agreement on minimum standards let alone conditions for a flourishing life. This fascinating 
chapter deserves more attention than we can offer here, but some comments are in order to illustrate how 
she conceives of reconciling wants and needs.  
 
Nussbaum argues against two extreme positions, what she calls subjective welfarism and Platonism, and 
develops her thinking on the general Aristotelian concept of ‘desire’. Contrasting the concepts of desire and 
preference, she asks what is the contribution of desire in the process of reaching such a ‘reflective 
equilibrium’ (WHD 151)? Her answer is that desire plays two roles: epistemic and political. First, ‘when 
people are respected as equals, and free from intimidation, and able to learn about the world, and secure 
against desperate want, their judgments about the core of a political conception are likely to be more 
reliable than judgments formed under the pressure of ignorance and fear and desperate need’ (WHD 152). 
Second, desire plays an ancillary role in justifying and buttressing the political support necessary for a 
reflective equilibrium to be sustained. She claims that once people learn new capabilities, they don’t want 
to go back. Even when women choose to return to traditional lives, such as a return to veiling, this is 
almost always ‘a change in their mode of functioning, not in their level of political capability as citizens’ 
(WHD 153). In other words they rarely insist, once experiencing the choice, that all women should be 
forced to veil. Nussbaum suggests that the epistemological and political roles of desire apply more strongly 
in subsequent generations. 
 
Her conclusion is that desires, in contrast to preferences, are not totally adaptive, for two reasons. On the 
one hand, ‘the human personality has a structure that is at least to some extent independent of culture’ 
(WHD 155). On the other hand, ‘by promoting education, equal respect, the integrity of the person, and so 
forth, we are also indirectly shaping desires’ (WHD 161). In this way there is the possibility of a bridge 
between her two stages in the shaping of an agreed list of human capabilities. This is an optimistic route to 
bridging the chasm between wants and needs, with which we began.  
 
But is it realistic? Professional doomsters, like for example John Gray, decry as utopian any attempt to 
achieve consensus and coordinated action around eradicating poverty, let alone around broader 
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11 The problem of the circularity of preferences and preference evaluation was one of the starting points of 
our work (THN: 22-24). 
emancipation, in a world of profound inequality. ‘The combination of rising human numbers, dwindling 
natural resources and spreading weapons of mass destruction is more likely to unleash wars of 
unprecedented savagery. If we can bring ourselves to look clearly at this prospect, we will lay aside utopian 
fantasies of global co-operation. We will see our task as staving off disaster from day to day’ (Gray, New 
Statesman  24.6.2002: 29). This benighted vision is unconvincing as well as morally abhorrent, but it 
should caution against the over-optimistic alternative. 12 
 
More importantly, Nussbaum has not in practice utilised the method she advocates. She has made some 
revisions to her earlier approach in response to discussions in India, the work of Martha Chen (1986) and 
other writers. However, this does not amount to systematically confronting her conception of the good with 
the values and experiences of the poor, as Clark (2003), for example, attempts to do in his study of South 
Africa.13 
 
Our goal in developing a different, hierarchical approach was similar to Nussbaum’s: to recognize cultural 
variety but to avoid subordinating the identification of needs to it. Our approach was, as we have seen, to 
develop a two-stage procedure. The first stage uses neo-Kantian arguments to develop a thin theory of 
human need. When focusing on health and autonomy of agency it is explicitly designed to fit all human 
societies. It deliberately seeks, so to speak, the lowest common denominator of universalisable 
preconditions for human action and social participation. In this way, we would claim, the potential for cross-
cultural consensus is heightened. At the second stage, we appeal to collective knowledge, from both the 
natural and the social sciences, to identify the pre-requisites for healthy and autonomous persons across 
different cultures (cf the remarks in the first section above concerning cross-cultural agreement on health). 
Against much post-modern scepticism we retain a belief in the potential of the scientific community to 
approximate an (ever-moving) consensus on the pre -requisites for human flourishing.  
 
Does not our approach risk the accusation of being paternalist? We believe not because we recognise the 
role of wide participation and experiential knowledge in understanding needs and need satisfiers. Drawing 
on Habermas’ theorisation of communicative competence and the ‘ideal speech situation’, we stress that 
common rules of debate are required.14 ‘Insofar as participants in such debates conform to the above 
standards, Habermas contends that the most rational solutions … will be those which achieve the widest 
consensus’ (THN 123). In the real world of dominant systems and interests, this entails at the least that ‘the 
codified knowledge of professional must confront the rationalised life-world – the ‘experientially-grounded 
knowledge’ – which ordinary citizens develop through such self-reflection’ (THN 125). Notwithstanding her 
rejection of Habermas’ proceduralism. there are some intriguing parallels with Nussbaum here; for 
example, the idea of rationality as consensus and the assumption of the goodness of ordinary people.  
 
However, what is underplayed in our approach is Sen’s valuable distinction between functionings and 
capabilities. Nussbaum embraces this, as when she writes: ‘Where adult citizens are concerned, capability 
not functioning is the appropriate political goal’ (WHD 87). This permits universal goals to be identified yet 
individuals’ rights not to pursue them to be given due weight. Fasting is not the same as starving; nor is 
celibacy the same as enforced sexual abstinence. This enables her to argue for both civil/political and 
social /economic rights. (By contrast, children may require enforced protection of and stimulation of their 
capabilities, for example through compulsory education). The functioning – capability distinction would help 
us to diminish lingering charges of paternalism (see Gough 2000, ch.1).  
                                                 
12 We certainly align ourselves quite closely with Nussbaum here: ‘The potential for rationality to dominate 
the political process is a linked to a moral vision which Habermas shares with Rousseau. It is a belief in the 
basic goodness of ordinary people and their potential to live, work, create and communicate together in 
harmony and to use practical reason peacefully to resolve their disputes and to optimise their need-
satisfaction’ (THN 124).  
13  In our upcoming Research Group on Wellbeing and Development  at Bath, we intend to address this 
issue both conceptually and in practice in sixteen sites in four developing countries. 
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14 That all participants possess the best available understanding concerning the technical issues of the 
problem, that they possess relevant methodological and communicational skills, and that the 
communication is as democratic as possible. 
 
Levels and thresholds 
 
A third point of comparison between our two approaches concerns the scope of the universalisable 
interests, which underlie our list of CHFCs/needs. Both Nussbaum and we endorse a broad view of human 
flourishing and wish to focus on minimal standards.  
 
Thus, on the one hand, Nussbaum continually speaks of ‘a fully human life’, of ‘a life truly worthy of a 
human being’. On the other hand, she identifies a lower threshold level of capability, a basic social 
minimum which should be secured for all citizens (WHD 73, 75). Much of the detailed argument in the rest 
of WHD focuses on this minimum rather than on a comprehensive list of requirement for human flourishing. 
 
In a similar vein we speak on the one hand of ‘human liberation’, ‘human flourishing’, ‘critical autonomy’ as 
a basic need, and the right to ‘optimal fulfilment’ of basic needs.  On the other hand, we focus much of our 
attention on a lower standard: on avoidance of serious harm and on minimally disabled uncritical 
participation in one’s form of life. This second level informs part III of our book, where indicators of basic 
and intermediate need satisfaction are specified. 
  
Gasper (1996) claims that as a result we can be criticized for both ‘over-reach’ and ‘parsimony’. ‘Over-
reach’ because the original derivation of basic needs in terms of harm-avoidance is then used to do too 
much work. The issues raised by critical autonomy are wide-ranging and deserve different and stronger 
forms of defence. Similarly, claiming optimal fulfilment of health care needs raises severe problems of a 
moral, not just a resource allocation kind, in an age where medicine can keep elderly people alive at vast 
cost. ‘Parsimony’, because our single-minded focus on health and autonomy excludes all aspects of life, 
like sex (and religion), which are not universally necessary for effective participation. This echoes Soper’s 
(1993a: 119) description of our ‘somewhat puritanical and limited’ list of basic and intermediate needs.   
 
Gasper concludes: ‘Doyal and Gough (are) drawn towards a broader conception of needs than seems 
implied by a criterion of avoiding serious harm. They formalize this by the extension to include critical 
autonomy, and their theory then has two versions, narrower and broader… We should accept that there 
are various criteria possible in needs discourse, each of which may be appropriate for different purposes. 
For pursuing a consensual priority for minimum requirements for decency, a narrower picture of needs is 
more appropriate than when trying to … prescribe for “human flourishing” or “the good life”… Both these 
major policy roles of needs analysis will be weakened by not clearly distinguishing between them.’ (Gasper 
1996: 31-32). 
 
This criticism is well taken. At the end of a long paper I merely offer two assertions in reply. First, the same 
verdict would seem to apply a fortiori to Nussbaum’s conceptualisation of central human functional 
capabilities. Second, I believe our distinction between autonomy of agency and critical autonomy provides 
a more rigorous foundation for our two-fold approach than Gasper claims.15 
 
Turning to the related and final issue of thresholds, I would claim that we go further than Nussbaum. While 
she promises to address this question, she delivers little. Our approach to the question of standards and 
thresholds (THN 159-64) is again hierarchical, but begins conceptually at Gasper’s highest level of human 
flourishing.  
 
At the stage of basic needs, we endorse neither absolute minimum, nor culturally relevant standards, but 
an optimum standard. In line with the two levels of autonomy we identify two such levels: a participation 
optimum and a still higher, critical optimum. The latter comprises those levels of health and cognitive, 
emotional and social capacities which permit critical participation in one’s chosen form of life. In practice, 
however, we endorse as a practical measure of this ‘the most recent standards achieved by the social 
grouping with the highest overall standards of basic need-satisfaction’. We concluded that in the late-
1980s, the best performing nation was Sweden. This also suggested a ‘constrained optimum’ standard for 
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15 But see Soper 1993a and 1993b for critical comments on this distinction. 
poorer countries: the highest achieved by countries at lower levels of development. We suggested these 
standard-setters were then Costa Rica for middle-income countries and Sri Lanka for poor nations. This 
could provide an empirical measure for assessing, for example, shortfalls in women’s capabilities in the 
developing world, but it hardly constitutes the independently-derived normative threshold with which we 
began. 
 
At the stage of intermediate needs, we argue for a minimum optimorum or minopt threshold. This is the 
minimum quantity of any given intermediate need-satisfaction required to produce the optimum level of 
basic need-satisfaction. The underlying assumption here is that the relationship is asymptotic: additional 
increments of a satisfier characteristic generating decreasing increments of basic need satisfaction until at 
the minopt point no additional benefit is derived. 
 
However, Soper and Wetherly criticise our basic need standard on related grounds. Soper contends that 
this standard may actually be too high, in that the extravagance of Swedish energy use and socio-
economic institutions is not generalisable to all other peoples in the world or to future generations. Insofar 
as this is true, it is accommodated within our definition of constrained optimum. But this raises a difficult 
issue. We have narrowed our focus from a concern with the universal requirements for social participation 
to whatever is universalisable across time and place in practice (Soper, 1993a: 78). This raises more 
issues than can be dealt with here, but at the end of the day ‘ought’ must imply ‘can’. If, due to past 
industrialism, population growth and environmental degradation we can achieve less than optimal 
generalisable satisfaction of basic needs, then so be it. We will be forever living in a world of constraint. 
Wetherly goes on to claim that this reintroduces relativism. The constrained optimum standard remains 
‘historically - and so socially, culturally - relative’ (Wetherly, 1996: 58). But the ‘and so’ does not follow. The 
concept of human need we develop is historically open to the continual improvements in understanding 
that have characterised human progress. But at any one time, there is a body of best knowledge to which 
international appeal can be made. Put crudely, our theory is relative in time but absolute in space. 
 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has concentrated on one aspect of Martha Nussbaum’s recent book – the derivation and 
identification of ‘central human functional capabilities’ - itself just one small part of her total oeuvre. My 
purpose has been to compare her approach with that developed by Len Doyal and myself in our theory of 
human need. The two works have much in common, including endorsement of a fully universal conception 
of human capabilities/ needs, a critique of relativism and a case for the constitutional rights of all peoples 
for their needs/ capabilities to be met. Both works articulate a conception of the good which aspires to be 
universal yet which is dynamic and open-ended. Both are also richer than Sen in their conception of human 
flourishing, for example in recognising the role of emotional capacities (cf Gasper 2002). 
 
How convincing are the two works in specifying and justifying a conception of human flourishing of 
relevance to policy across the developing world? Nussbaum derives her CHFCs from Aristotle’s writings on 
‘spheres of experience’ and their corresponding virtues. Following her deep engagement with ‘the hard 
practical reasoning of law’ and her extended research visits to India, she claims that her latest account 
expresses an overlapping consensus of people from differing cultures, but there is little evidence that this 
has in fact happened, or that, if it did, the result would be the same. The potential of informed desire to 
bridge the gulf between, in our language, wants and needs is unproven. Paradoxically, I believe that little of 
this harms her central argument, as expressed for example in the powerful and insightful chapters on 
religion and love, care and dignity. However, a stronger conceptual foundation for her list would give added 
strength to the thrust of her book. 
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On the other hand, the Doyal-Gough theory provides a more parsimonious and logical derivation of a thick 
conception of human flourishing and an equally detailed list of basic and intermediate needs. Beginning 
with a common human interest – to participate in one’s social form of life – we derive two basic human 
needs. We then call on codified and experiential knowledges to flesh out the universal pre-requisites for 
meeting basic needs at optimum and lower levels. This permits need satisfiers to be identified in a dynamic 
yet objective way. There is some evidence that the needs identified are more realistic and relevant than 
some of Nussbaum’s CHFCs. However, the exact way that codified and experiential knowledges are to be 
reconciled in our approach remains to be tackled – especially in a closely bound world of startling 
inequality and persistent cultural conflicts. I look forward to further debate on these issues. 
 
Nussbaum’s thick approach to human capabilities embraces a wide range of human activities and extols a 
broad vision of human flourishing, but its foundations are shaky and its potential for securing cross-cultural 
consensus is unproven and probably weak. Sen’s thin theory of capabilities has greater potential for 
identifying priority capacities and has a proven record in underpinning an international consensus on 
human development, but it provides little systematic or comprehensive guidance on components of human 
functioning or well-being. Our theory of human need, we would claim, combines the merits of both. By 
expounding a thin derivation, and by carefully distinguishing autonomy of agency from critical autonomy, it 
recognises cultural differences within a universalist framework, but by positing universal satisfier 
characteristics and recognising our collective understanding of these it provides a richer framework for 
conceiving, measuring and - conceivably - improving human well-being. 
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WeD - Wellbeing in Developing Countries ESRC Research Group  
 
WeD is a multidisciplinary research group funded by the ESRC, dedicated to the study of poverty, 
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